reform has been described as one of 'social contradiction' (Friedeburg) . The modern western principle of free universal education was established in post-reformation Saxony, and the European and North American models of secondary and higher education are rooted in the Prussian school reforms of the Napoleonic era. Yet despite, or perhaps because of, these historical achievements, child-focussed innovations in such areas as curriculum content and the integration of abilities, of the kind that have been applied with relatively little resistance in many western education systems, have found less favour within the Kultusministerien of the German Federal Republic. Those interested in the cultural connections of language and thought may suspect that the duality of needs which educational philosophers have laboured perennially to resolve is rendered particularly intransigent by a semantic differentiation in German, which distinguishes Bedurfnis, or needs that are identified and articulated by the subject, and Bedarf, or needs that require external validation.
Reconciling the legitimate needs of the child and of society was an important question for pedagogical theorists of the German Enlightenment -the Aufklàrung -whose contribution to the history of educational ideas was not insignificant. The more prominent were strongly influenced by Rousseauist idealism. Notable among these were Johann Bernhard Basedow, sometimes looked upon as 'the father' of German educational reform, and Joachim Heinrich Campe.
2 A lesser-known figure in this constellation is that of Ernst Christian Trapp (1745 Trapp ( -1818 , who is of historical interest, if for no other reason, as Germany's first professor of education. His brave attempts to erect a progressive yet pragmatic model of state education, beginning with the education of teachers, also merit more attention than they have received hitherto, at least in the English-speaking world. His attempted resolution of the issue of Bedurfnis and Bedarf "in the education of the child was less radical than that of some of his contemporaries, but perhaps more firmly rooted in social and cultural reality.
Schooled in theology and the early Kant, Trapp was a Gymnasium administrator, who in 1772 became principle contributor for education to the Neue AUgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek, which under the editorship of Christoph Friedrich Nicolai was the most influential organ of the Aufklarung. On the recommendation of Campe, he joined Basedow's Philanthropinum; however Basedow was evidently an intemperate adminstrator, and Trapp was not alone in finding him impossible to work with (Bowen 200) . 4 A welcome opportunity to leave Dessau came from Prussia, where the first school reforms had been set in train by Frederick the Great's minister, Zedlitz. One of Zedlitz's initiatives was the establishment of an education faculty (Erziehungsinstitut) at the University of Halle, which opened in 1778 -coincidently the year of Rousseau's death -and was granted Germany's first chair of education the following year. On Nicolai's recommendation, Trapp received the call. The reform of teacher education was a logical first step in the reform of the schools, and Trapp had already devoted much thought to this aspect. In his essay 'Von der Nothwendigkeit, Erziehen und Unterrichten als eine eigne Kunst zu studiren' (1779) he argued the recognition of education as a university discipline (Versuch einer Padagogik 5-12) -an argument that continues today in some quarters. In 1780 he published his major contribution to the discipline, his Versuch einer Padagogik, which is a systematic exposé of his pedagogical principles and proposals for curriculum reform. It is worth considering this document in its contemporary and historical context. First, however, Trapp's 'tribulations' as a pedagogical activist merit a brief narration, since they arose, partly from a certain personal lack of stamina, but also from an early instance of the 'social contradiction' which has proved particularly intransigent for German educational reform.
In Halle Trapp was opposed from the outset by the Faculty of Theology, where future teachers had traditionally been schooled in classical literature and the catechism. Perhaps because of such public opposition, Trapp's lectures were sparsely attended. In less than two years Zedlitz dismissed him for no stated reason other than that he was 'a foreigner who will not be missed.'
6 He then moved to Hamburg to direct one of Campe's progressive schools, which had six pupils and soon closed its doors, and thence to Brunswick as member of the 'Commission for school improvement' established by Duke Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand's minister, Hardenberg. Trapp, Campe and Johann Stuve, another noted figure in the philanthropic movement, constituted a Schuldirektorium mandated to assume control of the schools from the estates and church consistories. The inevitable power struggle underlines the fragility of the Enlightenment even in societies whose ruler (like Frederick the Great) claimed to support it. The Duke of Brunswick had secured the services of the greatest Aufklârer of them all, Gotthold Lessing, as Librarian in Wolfenbuttel. Yet when this triumvirate of pedagogues set forth its plans to improve teachers' training and working conditions, curriculum content, textbooks and methods, 8 showing particular concern for peasantry and for girls, 9 the cry went up that Christian schools had fallen into the hands of atheists. The Directorium was dissolved in 1790 and the schools restored to the control of the church and local gentry.
Thereafter Trapp confined his reform ideas to the pages of the journals he continued to edit, 10 at first in Brunswick and later, following the conservative reaction to the French Revolution, from Denmark. His death in 1818 went largely unnoticed. However he was remembered with respect as late as 1833, in a tribute by the memoirist Friedrich Karl von Strombeck, who wrote:
It is not possible to conceive of a man more humane, benevolent, or disposed to service and sacrifice than Trapp . . . Politically he was a republican, yet of moderate principles, who gratefully acknowledged in the excellent administration of Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand the ultimate goal of republicanism, which is the welfare of the whole.
11
'Welfare of the whole' ('Wohl des Ganzen') aptly summarizes the underlying mission of Trapp's Versuch einer Padagogik, four hundred pages of uneven style, ranging from the trivial to flights of lyricism, yet distinguished by their intellectual calibre from the pedantic teacher manuals typical of the time. Emerging from a wealth of practical advice on curriculum, methods and discipline are attempts to answer two fundamental questions of educational theory: how does the child acquire knowledge of the world? and how should the child be prepared for his/her future role within a predetermined social structure?
On the first question, Trapp adopts the empiricist position of Locke and others, that ideas enter the child's mind through the senses. Following the Scottish theologian Alexander Gerard, whose Essay on Genius (German translation, Leipzig 1776) is quoted frequently, ideas -'concepts,' as modern developmental psychologists would call them -are either simple or complex, the former reducible to similarity, difference, and approximation, the latter to coexistence, causality, and order. The associative links between them, which account for development of the mind, are established and strengthened by habit and affect. The process can also be facilitated by experiential learning situations, in which an adult mentor can direct the child's observation towards conceptually higher levels, an intriguingly modern belief.
13 While most of this is derivative, Trapp clearly espouses a more individualist view of child development than Locke. 14 Allowance is made for a degree of autonomy and individual variance. Thus young children learn most effectively under conditions of play ('freien Spielraum, ' 246) . This observation, too, contributes to the modern appearance of some of Trapp's thinking. He also endorses learning through discovery rather than rote (86-88), describes what sounds somewhat like a 'whole-language' reading lesson, 15 and suggests that other languages may be learned through subject content, 'immersion' in other words .
It is not the intent here to offer a detailed account of Trapp's curriculum and teaching methods, but rather to characterize his view of the learning process in relation to learner endowment. Where contemporary notions tended to discount children as individuals, seeing them as a more or less homogenous sub-species waiting to be civilized, Trapp remarks in a typical aphorism that they 'are cleverer than their teachers, only the latter have the consolation of knowing that they are more learned ' (325) . 16 An interesting illustration of this respect for the variant characteristics and abilities, in particular the affective potential, of individual pupils occurs in the section on teaching literature. In a radical departure from the classical curriculum, Trapp considers that contemporary authors, notably Fielding, Richardson, or the young Goethe, are more likely to stir the aesthetic sensibilities of the young, and that denying them such access would be counterproductive:
The discord between teachers and pupils can be seen very clearly when it comes to works of taste and sentiment. It often happens that the teacher expounds on Horace while the pupils are secretly reading the Sufferings of Werther. If they are caught doing so they are punished. But one ought to read such books with them, and feel with them, then afterwards they would also read the ancients with us ... A schoolchild despises a teacher who despises Werther and such books; and a despised teacher can never form the heart of one who despises him.
1
Education of the heart is acknowledged not only as a valid educational objective, but also as one not particularly amenable to authoritarian approaches. It recognizes a diversity of inner inclination, of preferences and perceptions. And yet, we cannot overlook the underlying expediency of what amounts to a temporary indulgence of the child's taste in literature, which becomes a means to an end, that of ultimate acceptance of the traditionally sanctioned literary fare. There is nothing to suggest a desire on Trapp's part to create a new generation of Sturmer una Drânger, their sensibilities at odds with the culture of the age, and his sceptical stance towards Rousseau remains to be noted.
On the one hand, this recognition of the child's unique individuality is significant for delineating the progressive aspects of Trapp's thinking, a recognition of subjectivity as an individual variable to be respected and harnessed, rather than stamped out. On the other, it poses something of a problem when it comes to the second question for educators, that of preparing the child for society.
To understand Trapp's thinking here we must begin with his premise on the ultimate purpose of education, which is to achieve the essentially eudaemonist goal of happiness, 'Gluckseligkeit' (literally, 'blessedness through good fortune'). The preamble to the Versuch sees education as a 'Bildung des Menschen zur Gluckseligkeit' ('formation of a human being for happiness,' 33). This formative process is later further refined as a 'Modifikation des Menschen in der Absicht ihn glucklich zu machen' ('modification of a human being to enable him to achieve happiness,' 265, my italics). Happiness, then, is not bestowed by birthright, but must be achieved, and this to a degree that is 'môglich und nôthig' ('possible and necessary/ 42). It has boundaries, which apparently are set by society: 'One should look not just to what can become of the individual by virtue of his nature but what must become of him in consideration of the society for which he is destined/ 18 Here, then, is Trapp's formulation of that duality of individual and society, which may be foundational to educational philosophy, beginning with Plato's directive to 'turn' the pupil's soul in the right direction, towards the light (Republic 750-51).
Not only does Trapp acquiesce in the idea that education is a socializing process, he also sees it as a 'natural' process ('naturlich'). The epithet carried authoritative weight in contemporary thinking; however, a study of the contexts suggests that in Trapp's case nature is understood more as a pragmatic than an idealistic construct. Natural education is one which 'das menschliche Leben im Kleinen nachmacht' ('imitates human life on a small scale/ 189). His proposals to teach by way of contemporary literature, practical experience, or object lessons from daily life, rest on their potential to reflect realities beyond the classroom walls. And there is no more compelling a manifestation of external reality than the structures of that society which the child must enter. The principle of Modifikation derives particular force from this belief. The child's innate disposition is either already inclined, or else it must be 'modified/ to fit its predictable social function. In either case the end result is a twofold 'welfare/ happiness all around, one presumes, since '[i]f one . . . can establish in the youth to be educated . . . dispositions which are similar to or harmonize with their future occupations in society, one attends at one and the same time to the welfare of society and the individual welfare of the pupil.'
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The dualism of Trapp's natural education is thus resolved through what amounts to a pedagogy of social conformity. Its most eloquent statement occurs, significantly perhaps, in a passage which takes issue with the leading voice of non-conformity, that of Rousseau, who had, as it were, written the book on Natural Education:
One travels best in human society by swimming downstream on that river that springs from existing laws, prevailing ideas, customs, habits and traditions. The truth of this is shown by the sad history of many worthy and unworthy men who have attempted the opposite. Who at this point does not think of Rousseau, the worthiest of them all? 20 Trapp distances himself from Rousseau elsewhere. In a discussion of Emile's 'Confession of the Vicar of Savoie/ he claims that his own natural education is based on 'familiarization' rather than 'instruction' ('indoc-trination'?), since it seeks to induce the love of virtue from 'what is present and visible' rather than what is 'future and invisible.'
21 Primarily, what is present and visible to the child (or must be made so) is, in Trapp's view, provided by existing social norms rather than those that may be established by a hypothetical future citizenry endowed with the moral autonomy to reshape society. 2 While Rousseauists may object that an individual born to freedom will not find happiness in filling an allotted function in a society whose forms and institutions have no legitimate foundation in nature, the intended beneficiaries of Trapp's reforms were that section of humanity not normally afforded the luxury of such quibbling, children of labourers and peasants, of whom he states: 'Der grôfite Theil der Menschen hat mittelmafiige Naturanlagen' ('the greatest part of humanity is of mediocre endowment,' 155). Here reside the qualities which society needs the most, namely: 'practical knowledge of socially useful skills,' ' diligence, pliablity, obedience, loyalty,' and a 'dutiful, cheerful and automatic execution of the functions of one's position or trade.' Trapp believed compassionately that ordinary children could be taught to achieve greater happiness in life, despite its inequalities. Non-conformity, from a rationalist, eudaemonist perspective, engenders suffering, which is sufficient reason to avoid it. The Versuch, which after all was intended for the education of teachers, is hardly a manifesto for the restructuring of society. Yet judging from his private correspondence and the documentation associated with the Brunswick reforms, Trapp the man held quite radical views on contemporary social institutions.
Freedom, though relativized by Trapp's pragmatic approach, is not totally extinguished, at least in the moral sense. Although externally bound by societal norms, children can attain a degree of inner emancipation through the exercise of their moral autonomy. In the early years they are to be permitted an 'illusion of freedom' ('Schein der Freiheit/ 208), the purpose of which is to enable them to experience connections between moral decisions and their consequences. Teaching by precept is thus replaced by what today would be called a cognitive approach, which presupposes the child's capacity to see purpose and meaning in received standards for right conduct. Trapp extends this principle to the learning of those virtues that rule or ought to rule the conduct of society in general, the principal one being tolerance (225-41). German literature's best known treatment of this popular theme of the Aufkldrung, Lessing's Nathan der Weise, was published in the same year as Trapp's Versuch, where it occasions a rhapsodic burst soaring above his characteristic cerebral prose. There is an incongruous foretaste of Schiller's ode 'To Joy' in his description of tolerance as the most essential bond of human society . . . the proffered hand of love which brings humanity together and dissolves and mediates the conflicts of brothers . .. the source of immeasurable joy that flows in upon us from our consciousness of exercising this virtue and from its effect on others, the benevolence it rouses in them towards ourselves.
If tolerance is the highest virtue, teaching it, modern educators know, is the most difficult of tasks, since it requires an unlearning, a 'modification' in Trapp's terminology, of an egocentric world view. He is short on particulars as to how this should be done, but he does remain consistent in his principles. As with its own conduct, the child must be given opportunities to perceive the practical harmful consequences for society of unsubstantiated opinion, when directed towards individuals or groups (235). Likewise it must be enabled to witness the overall communal benefits, the proliferation of happiness, that flow from the mutual acceptance of differences.
To summarise thus far, as a learning being Trapp's child, as it enters the hands of the pedagogue, is somewhat more complex than Locke's. Trapp sees children as having unique individualities and initially unique ways of perceiving the world, which must be respected and harnessed in the educational process. Unlike Rousseau, however, Trapp makes a clear statement that the ultimate outcome is submission to societal norms. Despite these constraints, does the initial acceptance of individuality contribute anything to the pedagogical process itself, regardless of outcome? How, in other words, is the teacher to use the hitherto unsuspected resources that lie within the untapped recesses of the mind and soul of the child? Trapp's solution is a simple but quite revolutionary one: the teacher must know the child. In his view, 'the reason why we know children so little, is first that we never bother to do so and secondly that they conceal themselves, their actions, and their motives from us, out of fear.'
26 In order to break this vicious circle, the teacher must place himself in the situation of an observer; in other words, he must become an empiricist, learning his subject, in the same way as the subject learns the world, through the senses.
If the empiricist mode was already firmly established by Locke, Trapp considers practicalities of what can clearly be recognized as a scientific empiricism. The teacher's role approximates that of an anthropologist, requiring objectivity, 'a practised eye,' and an extensive knowledge of different species of humanity in general and children of all ages (64). Thus equipped, the pedagogue enters an intimate association with the pupil as the latter's guide and mentor, a relationship which reminds us superficially of Rousseau; however, unlike the teacher-pupil relationship in Emile, this relationship, intended for the regular classroom, is manipulative in nature. The teacher leads the youth, when he believes he is leading himself, when 'the slightest stirring of emotion, the feeblest awakening of an idea in the youth cannot occur without the teacher noticing it, without his having instigated it for a particular purpose'{ray italics).
7 This hidden dependency, the pre-programmed awakening of an individual's self-knowledge at the hands of a wiser mentor whose absence from the action is illusory, would make the educational novel, or Bildungsroman, a distinctively German genre.
Trapp, then, conceptualizes the teacher-pupil relationship as a combination of ethnography and planned intervention. What distinguishes his pedagogical approach from prevailing practices is its insistence that pedagogical rules derive from the objectively observable reality of the individual child rather than from untested preconceptions (80) -the classical empirical principle. He thus makes a powerful plea for the application of experimental psychology to the human sciences, whether ethics or politics (22), and contends that education could provide as rich a field for scientific research as medicine:
As long as the world exists, there will always be something left for the physician and the pedagogue to observe, and the wealth of experiences in both these sciences, which are so analogous and which I therefore mention here together without excluding many others, is capable of growth into eternity.
With a side-swipe at the theologians who ruled contemporary education -as evidenced by his own career -he ascribes the corruption of the young, not to 'die verderbte menschliche Natur' or 'die Einblasungen des Satans' ('the corruption of human nature/ 'the whisperings of Satan/ 124-25), but to the failure to apply scientific empiricism to their upbringing. Here, then, is an early statement of a faith which has continued to sustain the theory and practice of education to the present day, leading to its eventual if anomolous acceptance into the ranks of the social sciences.
The empiricist's faith in observation is, of course, based on the most humane motives: respect for the distinctiveness of individuals, and fairness and objectivity in determining the most appropriate measures for their improvement. Yet how humane are these measures in their application? The question arises in consideration of Trapp's proposed design for a model classroom (165-74), which he adopted from his former teacher Martin Ehler, a philosophy professor at Kiel. It is based on the spatio-dynamic principle of restricting the direction of vision and interaction within the classroom to a multiplicity of two-way channels, between the teacher and individual pupils. The children are to be partitioned from one another in adjacent, enclosed cubicles, which are open only to the front. They are led into these at the beginning of the class and their desk-tops placed before them. High boards restrain them from touching or kicking each other -even from sexual misconduct. A row of steel spikes on each desk prevents them from leaving their enclosures at will. The spikes are covered with green cloth to discourage playing with them, but also to increase the fear element, since 'the hidden is more fearful than the visible' (168). Trapp quotes pages of this nonsense with evident approval, his only change being the provision of reading and writing necessities (172). What ensues is a teaching environment designed for the purest mode of observation and intervention, which offers, willy-nilly, the purest mode of control.
Trapp's classroom illustrates a real dilemma for what might be termed applied, particularly institutionally applied, rational humanism. That it is an inherited dilemma of our culture has been shown with devastating effect by Michel Foucault in Surveiller et punir, which documents the uses of observation in the prisons, asylums, and schools of Europe over the last two centuries. Through physical dispositions that became ever more restrictive and refined, culminating in Jeremy Bentham's plan for a prison which he called a Panopticon (1843), the prisoner, inmate, patient, or pupil could be subjected to perpetual observation by the warder/teacher. The ostensible result of this all-invasive knowledge-gathering, which left no aspect of the individual's daily life unnoted, was moral correction (modification?) of the socially unacceptable. Its reality was physical and moral control. One of its principles was what Foucault calls 'enclosure.' A good illustration is provided by a lecture on the evils of alcoholism delivered to the inmates of Fresnes prison in the early nineteenth century (Foucault, plate no. 8) . The prisoners are physically separated from each other and constrained to face the speaker through narrow slots at the top of the perpendicular boxes in which they stand. This particular enclosure technique is one of 'partitioning,' to achieve 'disciplinary space,' that is, space that tends to be divided into as many sections as there are bodies or elements to be distributed. One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation; it was a tactic of anti-desertion, anti-vagabondage, anti-concentration. (Foucault 143) The auditorium of Fresnes prison may not be so far removed from the humble country school room in which Trapp's ordinary child will be diagnosed and suitably modified for happiness in a world of rigid expectations. The relapse into an eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century obsession with controlling multitudinous bodies in order to shape the moral substance they house seems at odds with the belief sustained through much of the Versuch, that children can be reached and changed cognitively and affectively, through their understanding and sentiments. This is the underlying belief which marks the significant advance of Trapp's educational theory. In advocating Ehler's hen-battery of a classroom, one must assume he is saying that to reach and change the inner child one must first neutralize its innate unruliness, so that the sound principles of a natural (that is, pragmatic) education will yield their eventual fruits. This of course is the real dualistic dilemma facing all who teach for a given, rather than an imagined, world, those who labour to teach uniquely endowed individuals, in full knowledge and consideration of their uniqueness, yet for societies and within institutions that could not survive a day without their boundaries, rules, and expectations, their moral and physical constraints of every kind.
Germany's first professor of education, committed in his political and intellectual endeavours to Enlightenment goals of individual and communal happiness, was not immune to education's most bothersome dilemma, that of reconciling individualism and authority. Is there an alternative to embracing (Locke) or ignoring (Rousseau) established structures? Trapp at least attempts a middle way, proceeding from a psychologically sharpened view of the child and child development and a recognition of individual diversity. Enclosed within their classroom, as they will later be enclosed within their social class, children can still discover and preserve some valued inner part, that feels and sees diffently, even as the yoke of submission falls upon them. Versuch einer Padagogik is of interest to educational historians and scholars of the Aufklàrung alike. It is a worthy exponent of its sociocultural context, which deals with the same essential issues of purpose, process, and product that engage educational thinkers of any age. Perhaps it is a more honest document than those of other such thinkers. 29 Two readers of this paper have independently remarked on the similarity between this arrangement and a modern language laboratory, an interesting observation since the latter is based on a behavioristic learning theory of habit modification. Both diminish the interactive nature of learning, which Trapp appears to advocate, as noted earlier, to some degree.
